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Abstract 
Using a combination of migration studies, political sociology, and policy studies, this 
paper explores the contradictions and violence of immigration detention, its architectures, 
and its audiences. The concept of ‘detention-as-spectacle’ is developed to make sense of 
detention’s hypervisible and obscured manifestations in the European Union. We focus 
particularly on two case studies, the United Kingdom and Malta, which occupy different 
geopolitical positions within the EU. Detention-as-spectacle demonstrates that detention 
is less related to deterrence and security than to displaying sovereign enforcement, 
control, and power. A central aspect of the sovereign spectacle is detention’s purported 
ability to order and even halt ‘crises’ of irregular immigration, while simultaneously 
creating and reinforcing these crises. The paper concludes by examining recent 
disruptions to the spectacle, and their implications. 
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Detention-as-Spectacle 
Introduction  
Strident policy measures aimed at the deterrence, detection, control, and expulsion of 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers typify the trajectories of European states’ 
immigration practices over the last decade. Towards this end, sovereign borders have 
been fortified with fences, walls, guard towers, drones, and surveillance technology. 
Along with monitoring territorial borders, police and enforcement agents patrol the 
interior territory and even other states’ territories to detect and deter irregular residents 
and travellers. Third party actors hold lucrative contracts to build and manage many of 
these operations. This amplification of resources and power in the service of controlling 
people’s movements across and within borders can be understood as a ‘spectacle’ of 
immigration control (Andersson 2014: 133-176; Brown 2014; De Genova 2002; 
generally, Debord 2006). 
 
The enforcement arms of the spectacle exact heavy tolls. Re-routed migrants are injured 
and killed in record numbers. For example, the number of people dying while attempting 
to enter Europe is startling: in 2015, over 3,700 people drowned in the Mediterranean Sea, 
making it the deadliest year on record. These deaths accounted for 70 percent of migrant 
deaths documented globally and made the Mediterranean the world’s ‘most deadly region’ 
for migrants (IOM 2016). Despite these dangers, migrants continue to journey to wealthy 
regions, with a sizable upswing in the recent past towards both Europe and the United 
States. The Syrian, Afghan, and Iraqi conflicts, as well as continued instability in 
Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea, contribute to the high number of people attempting the 
Mediterranean voyage. Over the first 17 days of January 2016, approximately 18,000 
people arrived on the Greek island of Lesbos. By comparison, 752 migrants had arrived 
in all of January 2015 (Mackinnon 2016). Likewise, the number of Central American 
families crossing the US border climbed to more than 61,000 ‘family units’ and 51,000 
unaccompanied minors in 2014, double the year before (Hylton 2015). These numbers 
continue to ebb and swell in reaction both to Mexico’s reinvigorated and US-funded 
efforts to stop and return Central Americans as well as the continuing poverty, gang-
related persecution, and generalized violence that afflicts the Northern Triangle area of 
Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala (Brigden & Mainwaring 2016, forthcoming; 
Rosenblum and Ball 2016). 
 
Immigration detention plays a significant, yet often overlooked, role in the spectacle of 
migration enforcement. For example, European and other policymakers justify their 
detention systems by pointing to its perceived deterrent effects. United Kingdom (UK) 
Home Secretary Teresa May defends a detention-heavy ‘deport first, appeal later’ 
strategy. She argues that it ‘is about making it harder for people to be working illegally 
and setting a clear deterrent for those that want to stay here illegally’ (Wintour 2015). 
However, there is no credible proof that detention deters migration (e.g. Edwards 2011: 
13; Sampson 2015). Such divergence between stated and realized objectives suggests that 
detention systems contribute to the spectacle of enforcement in a particularly valuable 
way. 
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This paper argues that observers and analysts of migration ‘spectacles’ and ‘crises’ are 
unduly overlooking the roles played by detention. We introduce the concept of detention-
as-spectacle into the literature to deepen our understandings of the roles of both detention 
and the spectacular in migration governance. Detention-as-spectacle encapsulates the 
tautology that detention orders and even halts a ‘crisis’ of irregular migration that it 
simultaneously creates and reinforces. In other words, both the highly visible and subtler 
manifestations of detention imply the existence of a crisis of unregulated, undesirable 
migrants amassing; detention thus corroborates a populist impression that an out-of-
control, unwanted, and potentially dangerous inflow of non-citizens is amassing at the 
gates while signaling that the state is working to identify and punish this population.  
 
Further, detention-as-spectacle serves to project an image of the state’s monopoly of 
power over its frontiers and non-citizen populations. This image is aimed at four 
audiences and works to obscure detention’s human and financial costs as well as the 
state’s limitations in controlling migration and its borders. On this new understanding, the 
paper demonstrates how detention’s expansion is less related to government justifications 
of deterrence and national security, and more related to displaying sovereign power, thus 
potentially explicating the continuing expansion of detention despite mounting, 
persuasive evidence that it is harmful and ineffective at achieving its ostensible policy 
goals. 
 
To unpack the phenomenon of detention-as-spectacle, we take the European Union as our 
framework and focus on the UK and Malta: these states, though situated on different EU 
peripheries, present striking similarities and differences in their take-up and exploitation 
of immigration detention. While only one part of the spectacle of immigration 
enforcement, detention is interdependent with the rise, development, and expansion of 
other enforcement mechanisms, including deportation, interdiction, and extraterritorial 
patrols. We interpret detention-as-spectacle in these states as emblematic of the patterns 
and dynamics happening to varying degrees across Europe.  
 
The paper begins by reviewing detention operations in the UK and Malta, focusing on the 
expansion of and justification for these detention systems. We then examine the 
construction of migration crises along particular geopolitical fault lines, and how 
detention policies are presented as the evidence of and answer to these ‘crises’. The third 
section takes up insights from the sociological and cultural politics literature on spectacle 
and its recent applications to activities along borders and in borderlands. We build on 
these sections to conceptualize detention-as-spectacle, and examine how it is both highly 
visible but also more subtly placed in the Maltese and UK landscapes. Employing the 
concept of detention-as-spectacle allows us to explore detention’s contradictions, its 
forms of violence, its architectures, and its audiences. We conclude that detention-as-
spectacle reinforces the criminalization of the detained population as well as reifies and 
exaggerates state power and the efficacy of detention policy. By rethinking detention as 
spectacle and theorizing its implications, our research reveals new dimensions of how the 
political spectacle reinforces social hierarchies and inequalities. We conclude with some 
reflections on the potential for disruption to detention-as-spectacle.  
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Fortifying the Union? Immigration Detention at the Frontiers of Europe 
The territorial borders separating European states ‘soften’ as they join the European 
Union. This softening of the now-internal borders accompanies and justifies the 
hardening of the EU’s common external border (Mainwaring 2014: 105; cf. Wolff 2008: 
256). As a result, states along the southern and eastern European peripheries shoulder 
much responsibility for guarding the collective frontier. States with large international 
airports are also expected to act as gatekeepers. The UK and Malta, in particular, are 
located along a series of fault lines of migration and border control: they not only ‘guard’ 
their citizen-communities from unwanted outsiders, but Malta ‘protects’ Europe from 
African migrants arriving by boat, and the UK ‘polices’ Heathrow Airport, the most 
heavily trafficked airport in the world.3 
 
Immigration detention has been key to fortifying the EU territorial frontier. The advocacy 
organization Migreurop (2014) estimates that almost 600,000 people are detained each 
year within the European Union. Measured through resource and capital appropriation 
and policy shifts, detention is a fast-growing branch of border and immigration control. 
Now present in every EU Member State, detention nonetheless differs across these states 
in terms of who is detained, for how long, at what point, with what legal safeguards, and 
for which official purposes (Silverman and Nethery 2015). For instance, while the French 
detention time limit is 32 days, the German limit is six months with a potential extension 
to 18 months in ‘exceptional’ circumstances. Such differences undermine the common 
European asylum system and the detainee transfer agreements embedded in the Dublin 
Regulation (Carrera & Guild 2010). The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR 2011) 
recognized these inconsistencies when it suspended transfers to Greece in 2011 due to 
inhuman and degrading conditions in detention and in Greece more broadly, as well as 
deficiencies in the asylum process.  
 
Among Member States, the Maltese and UK detention systems stand out as cases of note. 
For example, Malta’s time limit of 18 months positions it at the far end of maximum 
detention periods. The EU Commission (2014b: 5, 57-58) reported that, in 2013, the 
average length of detention in Malta was 180 days. This was not only the highest average 
in the EU, but three times higher than in any other Member State and four and a half 
times higher than the average of 40 days across EU Member States. Malta also has the 
unique status of holding a mandatory policy to detain upon arrival any person who enters 
without authorization.4 For its part, the UK detention system is one of the largest in 
                                                
3 Although the UK remains outside the Schengen system and thus maintains border controls with other EU 
countries, the area’s existence and policies have an effect on the UK’s own migration and border policies 
and politics. Indeed, as we show in this paper with regard to detention, many of its restrictive migration and 
border policies are in line with those seen across Europe.  
4 In December 2015, the Maltese government announced it would end the mandatory detention of asylum 
seekers, though it would continue to automatically detain other migrants arriving without authorization. 
The decision was encouraged by years of campaigning by national and international organizations, as well 
as successful challenges to immigration detention at the European Court of Human Rights (2013a; 2013b) 
in recent years. The move is also in line with amendments to the EU Reception Conditions Directive made 
in 2013. At the time of writing, the change has yet to be implemented (Dalli 2015). 
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Europe and the only one without a statutory upper time limit.5 
 
The last decade has seen Malta and the UK spend more money to detain more people 
than ever before. The roles played by corporations and other security actors have 
expanded and been reinforced in tandem. This growth of immigration detention has 
occurred despite criticisms from local, regional, and international advocacy 
organizations, including recent national inquiries conducted in both states that concluded 
with strong calls for reform (All Party Parliamentary Group 2015; Valenzia 2014). The 
next sections explore these detention policies and state justifications for them in further 
detail. We argue that given the criticism, the availability of alternatives, and the lack of 
evidence that detention deters irregular immigration, Malta and the UK are employing 
detention as punishment and spectacle 
The Expansion of Detention in Malta and the UK  
In liberal democracies, the legal norm is that deprivation of liberty is exceptional. 
Therefore, national law must legislate for detaining migrants. According to international 
law, detention must be reasonable, proportional, non-arbitrary, adhere to due process, and 
be used only after non-custodial alternatives prove to be inadequate. Moreover, states’ 
duty to offer protection to refugees means that the conditions on detaining asylum seekers 
are stricter than those for irregular residents or non-citizens with removal orders. The 
international framework also stipulates that since immigration detention is an 
administrative tool, it must be non-punitive. As pointed out in the literature, this 
administrative and non-punitive status presents a loophole whereby detainees are 
incarcerated for long periods of time without the attendant rights enjoyed by criminal 
offenders (e.g. Chacón 2014: 623).  
 
The UK detention system evolved from an ‘emergency’ wartime technology into an 
everyday tool of migration management (Silverman 2012). Since its early origins in the 
Aliens Act 1905 and formal legislation in the Immigration Act of 1971, detention has 
trended towards a stricter practice with fewer opportunities for release. The figures bear 
out this pattern: until the early 1990s, overall numbers were low (about 200-300 detainees 
at any time) and asylum seekers were rarely detained or deported (Welch and Schuster 
2005: 337). Thereafter, the daily population increased from 250 detainees in 1993 to over 
2,250 in 2003 and then to around 4,000 in 2013 (Schuster 2004). Asylum seekers 
generally comprise about half the detention population.6 
 
Detention centres have proliferated to house this growing population: while there was one 
UK detention centre in 1993, as of 2015, there are 15 official facilities, including short-
term holding centres and ‘immigration removal centres’. The Government subcontracts 
management of most facilities to private firms and the HM Prison Service. The system’s 
physical infrastructure and regimes of surveillance and control are adapted from penal 
institutions. Penal-like characteristics include: CCTV and other electronic surveillance 
                                                
5 The UK’s position outside the Schengen zone has allowed it to opt out of the EU’s Return Directive 
(2008), which sets an 18-month time limit on detention.  
6 The causal connections linking fewer offers of asylum and repressive detention practices, such as end-to-
end and fast-tracked procedures, is explored elsewhere (e.g. Gibney 2008; Griffiths 2015). 
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mechanisms; the use of solitary confinement; transport vans with bars and guards; and 
the handcuffing of detainees. In FY 2013/14, the detention system cost taxpayers £164.4 
million, with the cost of detaining one person for one year averaging £36,026.7 The cost 
of detaining the majority of detainees eventually released is estimated at £76 million per 
year (Detention Action 2014: 7). 
 
As in the UK, Maltese detention policy was formally legislated in 1970 with detainee 
numbers remaining minimal until an increase in unauthorized arrivals in 2002. The 
increase coincided with the run-up to Malta’s 2004 accession into the EU, after which an 
18-month time limit was set. Detention is ostensibly mandatory for every ‘prohibited 
immigrant’, who either arrives or is found in Malta without leave to remain. In reality, 
however, the population is comprised primarily of migrants and refugees rescued at sea 
by the armed forces. In line with the EU’s 2003 directive on minimum reception 
standards, asylum seekers are released once their claims are successful or after 12 months’ 
detention. The government’s announcement in December 2015 that they will end the 
mandatory detention of asylum seekers will benefit this population if implemented. 
Nevertheless, as already noted, Malta currently detains individuals for longer on average 
than any other EU Member State (EU Commission 2014b: 5, 57-58).  
 
As of 2014, Malta operated two primary detention facilities, both located in converted 
military barracks with overflow populations housed temporarily in police stations. Between 
2002 and 2012, Malta detained 16,000 individuals, averaging 1,500 people per year. In 
2008, the Maltese Government spent over €8.2 million on detention, an increase from 
€6.8 million in 2005 (Maltese Parliamentary Question 2009). That year, the system cost 
taxpayers an average of €23,000 per day. 
 
The roles of security actors within detention have been reinforced as detention systems 
expand across Europe. Both Malta and the UK rely upon security actors to carry out their 
detention policies: a handful of multinational conglomerates manage and run most of the 
UK’s detention centres, while in Malta the armed forces play a large role in housing and 
managing detention centres.8 By employing private companies as early as 1970, the UK 
initiated a European precedent that is now commonplace. Moreover, the privatization of 
UK immigration detention predated, and perhaps catalysed, that of prisons and jails in 
their modern form (Menz 2011: 124). These security actors in Malta and the UK benefit 
from the roles they play in detention, and champion its use as an effective deterrent and 
form of immigration control. Their involvement also allows states to outsource legal, 
political, and moral liability for events occurring inside detention centres to varying 
                                                
7 On top of these costs are additional compensation payouts related to cancelled flights, legal representation 
costs, and remuneration for unlawful detention. Between 2011 and 2014, for example, the UK Government 
paid nearly £15 million in compensation for unlawful detentions (The All Party Parliamentary Group 2015: 
21). 
8 This reflects patterns in other countries, where privatization may or may not have occurred, but where the 
participation of other actors, such as the military and police, is commonplace. In Italy, for instance, border 
police operate particular detention facilities at ports of entry, such as Lampedusa. In Greece, former army 
camps and military barracks have been transformed into detention centres (ARCI 2012; cf. 
http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/europe/greece/introduction.html).  
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degrees, arguably to a greater degree in the case of for-profit private actors (cf. Bacon 
2005). 
State Justifications for Detention: Security and Deterrence? 
The UK and Maltese Governments remain stalwart that detention is not arbitrary, and that 
it stems irregular immigration flows. Policymakers in those countries defend detention as 
an integral aspect of the effort to control and manage borders and foreigners’ movements. 
Notions of sovereignty and power over territory and admittance animate their discourse, 
and coalesce around the two themes of national security and deterrence. The security 
studies literature has demonstrated the corrosive effects of the creation in Europe of a 
continuum linking drugs, terrorism, immigration, asylum, and the internal market (e.g. 
Huysmans 2006; Huysmans & Buonfino 2008). In this section, we focus on how, in the 
UK and Malta, government rhetoric depends on the reification of ‘national security’ and 
the threat that irregular immigrants pose to it.  
 
A survey of the modern history of the UK detention system demonstrates that now-
familiar tools of identification and isolation were introduced in the lead-up to the First 
and Second World Wars, and the Gulf War, and normalized through an appeal to national 
security concerns during wartime (Silverman 2012). In Malta, policymakers justify strict 
detention policies with reference to the small size of the country and the ‘disproportionate’ 
numbers of unauthorised arrivals on the island (Mainwaring 2014; 2012). The Home 
Affairs Minister defended the national detention policy as the ‘only way of safeguarding 
national security’. Despite a lack of evidence or precedent, the Minister also claimed 
detention was necessary in order to ascertain that migrants and refugees arriving without 
authorization were not terrorists (Times of Malta 2013). The recent Maltese and UK 
national inquiries found that this common strategy of justifying detention by equating 
them with national security risks achieves only the degradation of the human rights of 
detained and non-detained immigrants and asylum seekers (All Party Parliamentary 
Groups 2015; Valenzia 2014; cf. Dauvergne 2007).  
 
Along with alleged national security issues, deterrence is also a key component of 
Maltese and British rationales for practicing and expanding their detention systems. 
While refuted by evidence (e.g. Edwards 2011: 13), detention has long-been touted as a 
deterrent mechanism, since as early as 1906 in the UK (Silverman 2012). In Malta, 
policymakers continue to perceive detention as a ‘powerful deterrent’ to unwanted 
immigrants (Mainwaring 2012). Beyond its effectiveness and the ethics of incarcerating 
people to dissuade others from undertaking journeys that are their legal rights to pursue, 
international law expressly prohibits using detention as a deterrent. 
Harms of Detention 
Detention exacts significant social, physical, and mental costs on detainees, their 
networks, and the broader communities in which they are located. Galina Cornelisse 
(2010: 21) points out the many problems in European detention centres result from 
overpopulation and inadequate medical, psychological, and hygienic care. Substantiating 
this, a 2009 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) documents how detention in Malta 
endangers the physical and mental health of detainees, often having a long-term impact. 
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The report condemns the centres’ appalling living conditions, barriers to healthcare, poor 
hygiene standards, and inadequate shelter (MSF 2009; cf. ECHR 2013a). Likewise, the 
deleterious effects of the UK detention centre are elaborated in a number of scientific 
studies (e.g. Robjant et al 2012; Sen et al 2014). 
 
Detainees report feeling that their detentions reduce them to criminals, animals, or worse: 
former female UK detainees describe how ‘[t]hey are verbally abusive in here…They just 
see you like animals… The way they treat you. They want to get rid of you. You feel 
neglected and unwanted’ (Girma et al 2014: 31). In extreme, though not uncommon, 
cases, detention becomes a matter of life and death: two men died in Malta after being 
beaten by detention staff in 2011 and 2012 (Aditus 2012), and at least 22 UK detainees 
have died since 1989 (Athwal 2015: 54).  
 
Detention’s expansion seems more inexplicable in light of the availability and viability of 
non-custodial, community-based supervision programs – known as Alternatives to 
Immigration Detention programs – that reduce the harm to enrolled non-citizens. A 
number of international advocacy organization endorse the implementation of 
Alternatives such as reporting requirements, structured community supervision, and case 
management programmes (e.g. Edwards 2011; IDC 2011; JRS 2012).9 The organizations 
emphasize that alternatives to detention are more humane and cost-effective, while also 
meeting state goals that are often put forward to justify detention: (i) to prevent migrants 
and asylum seekers from absconding; (ii) to ensure that non-citizens cooperate with 
immigration officials in resolving their claims, in particular with regard to establishing 
their identity; and (iii) to effectuate deportation of non-citizens who are found to have no 
legal right to stay (Costello and Kaytaz 2013: 7). 
Creating Crisis at the Border 
How is it that detention systems costing so much but failing to achieve governments’ 
stated goals and rationales are encouraged to grow even bigger? Such policy decisions 
are justified as defenses against migration ‘crises’. However, as we argue here, these 
crises necessitating detention are manufactured in state’s interests and sustained, at least 
in part, by detention itself. As Peter Andreas (2003: 3) points out in the US-Mexico 
borderlands context, immigration enforcement measures may be ‘politically successful 
policy failures’: in other words, detention succeeds in sending a message of sovereign 
power and control while failing in terms of its official policy aims. 
 
Indeed, states have long selected certain migration flows to interpret and broadcast as 
crises. Since the end of the Cold War, these ‘crises’ are increasingly used to justify new 
measures of exclusion and externalization that reduce access to territory and rights, 
especially for the poor and those in need of international protection (Hyndman 2012). 
Laws, practices, and discourses work in tandem to seal borders against ‘unwanted’ non-
citizens seeking admittance and residence. These processes of securitization and 
militarization root state-led efforts to ‘contain’ migrants through interdiction and 
                                                
9 Moreover, the European Commission (2014b: 33-34) reports that 24 out of 26 surveyed EU Member 
States already afford alternatives to detention to those considered the most vulnerable.  
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detention, particularly in neighbouring states of the Global South (Chimni 1998; 
Huysmans 2000; Huysmans and Squire 2010). 
 
‘Crises’ are political phenomena that mobilize fear, uncertainty, and a discourse of 
emergency (Milstein 2015: 142; Mountz & Hiemstra 2014: 384-85). Crises define and 
explain the ‘problem’ and its appropriate intervention (Widmaier et al 2007; Stanley 
2014: 898). In doing so, their construction makes room for a politics and practice of 
exceptionalism, whereby routine responses are seen as insufficient and measures beyond 
the law are justified. For instance, Didier Bigo (2002: 72-73) reminds us of this initial 
political mobilization that can lead to the securitization of migration and that is 
overlooked in the securitization literature, which treats security as a separate sphere to 
politics. Detention-as-spectacle can thus be seen as a facet of ‘securitization as everyday 
practice’ (Ibid; cf. Léonard 2010).  
 
Migration scholars find that states may create crises ‘in order to legitimate grounds to 
implement what might otherwise be controversial security measures’ (Hyndman 2012: 
247; cf. Mountz & Hiemstra 2014). Successive Maltese Governments have interpreted 
migration as a crisis, with a particular focus on the state’s small size and its geographic 
location on the EU’s southern periphery; they have used this discourse to justify Maltese 
detention policy (Mainwaring 2012; 2014). In the UK, the discourse of a migration crisis 
dates back at least to 1978 when Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher warned that Britain 
would be ‘swamped’ by immigrant cultures. Defense Secretary Michael Fallon echoed 
these incendiary words in 2014, claiming that UK towns were ‘swamped’ by immigrants 
and their residents ‘under siege’ (Syal 2014). Contemporary UK and Maltese discourses 
feature sensationalist and unsubstantiated accounts of an uncontrollable inflow of 
immigrants catapulted by conditions in the unpatrolled migrant camps in Calais, France, 
political unrest in Libya, the duplicity and exploitation of smugglers operating across the 
Mediterranean Sea, and so on. These narratives construct a myth of invasion and crisis by 
obscuring the historical movement of people, armies, goods, and capital that 
contextualize current migration flows, as well as the role that states and their economic, 
migration, and foreign policies play in encouraging current forms of ‘irregular’ migration 
(cf. de Haas 2008; Mountz and Loyd 2014; Rigby and Schlembach 2013). In turn, the 
constructed crises create space for exceptional politics and practices and set the stage for 
a humanitarian and enforcement spectacle at the border and beyond.  
The Border Spectacle 
The minority of migrants and refugees who arrive at the EU’s borders confront additional 
barriers of walls, ‘push back’ policies at sea, bilateral repatriation agreements, and, of 
course, a possibility of detention. Signalling a reassertion of sovereign power, control, 
and order, these measures are justified as the necessary response to migration ‘crises’ as 
well as evidence of the crises. Scholars describe such shows of force as a border spectacle, 
or a border game that fails to reach its goals. The spectacular nature conceals both the 
ineffectiveness and the inherent violence of these border manoeuvres (Andersson 2014; 
Andreas 2003; Brown 2014; de Genova 2002; Doty 2009; Husymans 2000).  
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Our conceptualization of detention-as-spectacle builds on this research and the insights of 
theorists examining the political spectacle. Our understanding moves past the spectacle at 
the border to the interior of the state. The analysis of detention-as-spectacle demonstrates 
how detention policies target resident populations as well as border-crossers, and thus 
contribute to the spectacle of sovereign control. In line with earlier observations, we 
conclude that the power of detention-as-spectacle’s embrace is at least partially due to its 
success at obscuring its high costs and limited effectiveness as a deterrent and deportation 
mechanism. 
 
The political and social theorist Guy Debord (2006: 7) argues that the spectacle ‘is not a 
collection of images; it is a social relation between people that is mediated by images.’ 
While a falsification of reality that distances people from their social realities, the 
spectacle is also a product of that reality. Contemporary scholars characterize the 
spectacle as producing an invisible curtain that separates the action that the audience has 
access to onstage from the purposeful ‘allocation of values’ that takes place backstage 
(Wright 2005: 664). This hidden backstage is also the site of allocating benefits accruing 
from financial opportunities or political influence. In the next two sections, we discuss 
the spectacle’s roles in obscuring and making visible certain social and political processes.  
 
Murray Edelman's (1988) theories of symbolic politics and political spectacle are 
particularly helpful for elaborating detention-as-spectacle. Edelman is interested in the 
significance of emotional politics and crisis discourse. Edelman contends that political 
problems gain life in popular discourse not because they are simply there but because 
they are reinforced constructs of a social reality and ideology that disseminate certain 
messages so as to appear self-evident (cf. Doty 2009: 66). Jef Huysmans’ (2000: 762) 
study of EU security measures similarly concludes that the political spectacle is ‘an 
institution through which meaning is conferred by evoking crisis situations, emergencies, 
rituals such as consultations or elections, and political myths.’  
 
The language of the political spectacle is highly dependent on ambiguous metaphors. It 
relies on political stages, props, and the use of symbolic objects. In the case of the 
immigration crisis, this means a consistent return to images of bodies flooding across 
borders. The fact that UK officials echoed each other’s swamping metaphors speaks to 
the import of this discourse. White (2002: 1056) describes the symbolic power of 
‘hydraulic’ language in the UK:  
 
Flows may be ‘out of control’ threatening the livelihoods of all citizens, thus 
‘floods’ of refugees or asylum seekers threaten to ‘swamp’ the state. 
Representing the state and refugee movements in such a simplistic, but 
seductively holistic, way legitimates the replacement of polyvocal, complex 
and chaotic stories and realities of migrant life with a monochrome universe 
of truth. 
 
The spectacle’s language produces emotional responses and facilitates actors’ designation 
into roles as leaders, allies, and enemies. While selectively bringing acclaim or notoriety 
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to key political actors, the spectacle reduces anyone else coming into contact with it to a 
spectator.  
 
The spectacle is also characterized by disconnects between means and ends. For instance, 
in the context of border control, the spectacle is performed under a mandate to stop a 
migration ‘crisis’ while simultaneously creating and reinforcing its appearance to the 
public. The studies of Nicholas De Genova (2004), Wendy Brown (2014), and Ruben 
Andersson (2014) are particularly useful here. For De Genova (2004: 177), a ‘spectacle 
of enforcement’ produces ‘illegality’ as a categorical identity for migrants. This spectacle 
is created through the staging of guards, vehicles, drones, and walls at the increasingly 
militarize US-Mexico border. After sustained performances, the spectacle of enforcement 
at the border and its bugaboo of the ‘illegal alien’ gain a ‘commonsensical air of a 
“natural” fact’ (De Genova, 2004: 177).  
 
Andersson (2014) analyses border theatrics on and around the Canary Islands and the 
Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. His analysis reveals the dual enforcement and 
humanitarian spectacles that occur around the border. As with theatre, these spectacles 
reveal only a sliver of a more complex reality. For instance, Andersson finds that the 
rescue of migrants at sea to be key to a humanitarian rescue narrative, but this narrative 
also acts as the proverbial curtain that obscures the detention centres and violence 
awaiting migrants once they reach the Canary Islands. Similarly, Brown analyses the 
construction and maintenance of walls as symbols and signifiers of territorial sovereignty 
in its twilight of decline. Brown (2014: 25) argues succinctly that, ‘notwithstanding their 
strikingly physicalist and obdurate dimensions, the new walls often function theatrically, 
projecting power and efficaciousness that they do not and cannot actually exercise and 
that they also performatively contradict.’ The next section reveals and examines 
detention’s under-acknowledged roles in propagating the border spectacle and the 
spectacle of sovereign control in the European context. 
Detention-as-Spectacle 
In parallel with developments at the border, detention-as-spectacle has become an 
important facet of post-9/11 and post-7/7 immigration enforcement activities in Europe 
and North America. It is a visual display of power to showcase governments’ actions 
against migrants categorized as ‘illegal’, both in terms of containment and punishment, as 
well as a signal of the deportation that will ostensibly follow. Such theatrics obscure the 
financial, social, and other costs of detention. Instead, by presenting the ‘onstage’ 
detention centres as models for efficiently deporting people, detention theatrics contribute 
significantly to the spectacle of sovereign control. In both of our case studies and 
elsewhere, detention-as-spectacle obscures the fact that most detainees are not deported,10 
and that those who are released fill labour market shortages (OECD 2014).  
 
There are important similarities and differences between the border and detention 
spectacles. Echoing the border spectacle, detention-as-spectacle involves a disconnect 
                                                
10 The European Commission (2014a) notes the gap between those issued a return order and those removed 
from EU territory: for example, in 2012, 484,000 people were given a return order and only 178,000 or 
37% were removed. This trend was similar in 2011 (34%) and 2010 (37%). 
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between means and ends: although states commonly justify detention on the grounds that 
it acts as a deterrent and is necessary due to security concerns, there is little evidence that 
either of these goals are achieved through detention (Edwards 2011). Detention-as-
spectacle is thus similar to the border spectacle that projects an image of state law and 
order, while simultaneously creating illegality and precarity. Both spectacles rest on and 
reinforce the assumption that migration can and should be ‘managed’. The managed 
migration paradigm currently popular in liberal states, including the UK and Malta, 
characterizes unmanaged migration flows and the presence of irregular migrants as a 
problematic anomaly rather than an increasingly normal feature of society encouraged by 
state policies and labour market needs. Failures are interpreted as opportunities for better 
management. True reform is stymied (Doty & Wheatley 2013: 429). 
 
However, in many ways, the detention spectacle is less dramatic than maritime rescues, 
racialized bordering practices, and electrified walls staged at the border. While 
policymakers may evoke detention to indicate sovereign control and managed migration, 
and national and other inquiries momentarily shine light on some of the darkest corners 
of the system, the material structures and everyday practices of detention remain 
obscured much of the time.  
 
While detention practices and policies appear arguably less dramatic, they are noteworthy 
in the ways they resemble criminal punishment. Such criminalizing frames and 
manifestations contribute to the spectacle: while detention is ostensibly meant to punish 
rule-breakers, and to deter future migrants from similar behaviour, the ineffective nature 
of this goal is never apparent because of the overwhelming imagery projected by 
detention-as-spectacle. Beyond the use of re-rolled prisons and the aforementioned 
import of surveillance regimes from British and Maltese prisons, the similarity is 
apparent in the involvement of security actors, including the military, police, and 
correctional companies. Their profitable participation contributes to the militarized and 
penal nature of immigration detention and also defies governments’ repeated 
protestations that detention is merely an administrative measure – the root of its legal 
sanctioning. 
 
As with prisons, detention-as-spectacle is framed as a disciplining measure, as the 
sovereign infliction of ‘regrettable but necessary’ suffering upon rule breakers (Silverman 
2012). As such, detention embodies the principle of less eligibility, ‘a penal doctrine that 
dictates that prisoners must at all times experience conditions that are worse than what a 
poor and free human subject experiences out of prison’ (Pugliese 2008: 210).11 The 
inherent violence of detention is therefore made less visible (and spectacular), while a 
‘rational’, disciplining logic is foregrounded (Foucault 1995). In this way, the real harms 
and costs of imprisonment without trial and limited judicial oversight are obscured and 
legitimated behind a façade of punishing rule-breakers, deterring unwanted foreigners, 
and combating a ‘crisis’. Thus, detention-as-spectacle not only supports the 
                                                
11 Bridget Anderson (2013: 25-26) locates the principle of ‘less eligibility’ in early attempts to control the 
mobility of the poor through policies such as Britain’s 1834 Poor Law and workhouse tests. She argues 
these Victorian Era tests should be interpreted as predecessors for contemporary migration controls and 
debates.  
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criminalization of migrants and refugees, but also bolsters the power of the state. 
Symbolically, it signals that the state is responding to the ‘crisis’ of migration, creating 
order through punishment, containment, and exile in the face of uncontrollable flows of 
migrants.  
 
As it punishes, detention-as-spectacle also creates distance between the detainee and the 
citizen: the detainee is constructed as deserving of punishment and as the dangerous 
‘other’ through rhetoric, practice and material infrastructure (cf. Pugliese 2008). Many 
politicians stigmatize migrants as exhibiting racial, religious, linguistic, or other 
culturally different attributes to make them appear socially inassimilable and thereby 
threatening and deserving of incarceration (e.g. Bradford & Clark 2014; Yuval-Davis et 
al 2005). As Judith Butler (2009: 1) argues ‘specific lives cannot be apprehended as 
injured or lost if they are not first apprehended as living’. The other-ing of non-citizens 
drives the increasing criminalization of immigrants and asylum seekers (Hernandez 2012; 
Malloch & Stanley 2005). The involvement of security actors across different forms of 
migration controls encourages the criminalization of migrants. Moreover, this stigma is 
usually racialized: debates in the UK, Malta, and elsewhere conflating migration, 
criminality, and imprisonment associate incarceration with racialized minorities, 
regardless of migrant status. Such prejudicial logic others migrants as threatening to the 
community, and normalizes recourse to detention. In turn, detention-as-spectacle serves 
to further criminalize working immigrants, bolster public suspicion of irregular 
immigration, and generate support for future enforcement actions, including more 
detention (cf. Mountz et al 2013). 
Violent Spaces: The (In)visible Architecture of Detention-As-Spectacle 
The spectacle is mediated by images, and thus the balustrade of detention-as-spectacle is 
its physical architecture. In both the UK and Malta, detention infrastructure reinforces the 
political messages and material realities of detention-as-spectacle, though sometimes in 
contradictory ways. Barbed wire, CCTV cameras, restricted access, confined and 
disciplinary spaces, and the absence of freedom of movement for detainees are typical 
characteristics of detention centres in Malta, the UK, and other European states. These 
features contribute to the discursive securitization and criminalization of migrants and 
refugees, while also having very real consequences for the mental, emotional, and 
physical health of detainees (cf. Chak 2014). The involvement of security and 
correctional companies, the military, and the police also amplifies the impacts of the 
architecture of detention within the spectacle. Detention spaces reinforce logics of 
deviance, threat, and punishment, while inflicting violence on detainees, their families 
and friends, and the communities in which they are embedded. 
 
In her study of offshore detention centres, Alison Mountz (2015) observes how migration 
controls oscillate between invisibility and hypervisibility. Similarly, the architecture of 
detention centres located within the sovereign territories of the UK, Malta, and other 
states renders visible but also obscures detainees and detention policies. Detention-as-
spectacle is a process of politicized and purposeful revelation and concealment, to stage 
certain actors and ‘props’ for consumption and interpretation by specific audiences at 
appointed times. Specifically, the architecture of detention makes hypervisible a sense of 
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an irregular immigration crisis, the logics of punishment and securitization, and a social 
distance between imprisoned detainees and citizens legally resident outside the gates. In 
the Australian context, Pugliese (2008: 213) argues that the transparent grid of the razor 
wire fences enclosing detention centres ‘renders the imprisoned refugee into a figure of 
penal spectacle’ and signals sovereign power over migration. Simultaneously, the 
spectacular architecture obscures the everyday violence that detention inflicts, the lives of 
those imprisoned, as well as ‘the transnational communities, geopolitical relations, and 
colonial histories in which they are embedded and embroiled’ (Mountz 2015: 186).12  
 
UK and Maltese detention centres embody this in/visibility.13 On the one hand, they tend 
to be located in rural areas. Their remoteness detaches detainees from legal 
representatives, as well as advocacy and kinship networks, leaving them further 
marginalized physically and socially. The centres’ far-flung locations hide the material 
structures of detention, thereby obscuring – or pushing offstage – the violence within. 
Moreover, detention centres in Malta and the UK often adjoin prisons or military 
barracks. Immigrants and asylum seekers are ‘hidden in plain sight’ (cf. Pachirat 2011) 
and become further elided with the figure of the criminal. On the other hand, detention 
centres may become momentarily visible, in the media for example, during moments of 
protest or other disruption. In these instances, the visible architecture reinforces detainees’ 
criminality reminding the citizen audience that their detention is warranted. As will be 
further explained in the next section, detention centres are made more continuously 
visible in a discourse that assures citizens that the state is ‘tough on migration’ and 
reminds noncitizens of their deportability. Indeed, even when the physical structures are 
absent from the landscape, the state uses the immigration enforcement spectacle to ensure 
that a threat of detention and deportation remains a conditioning facet of migrants’ 
everyday life (De Genova 2002).  
 
Detention’s architecture in Malta and the UK mirrors detainees’ collective lack of global 
mobility (cf. Bauman 1998). Maltese detention centres are located within operational 
military barracks, and are surrounded by high walls and chain-linked fences topped with 
barbed wire. The design promotes control, observation, and the denial of privacy and 
intimacy: for example, where detainees are housed in large rooms rather than 
warehouses, they are not permitted doors. Barred windows and limited outdoor access 
create further layers of exclusion. The military barracks’ physicality not only transmits a 
message that migrants are criminals requiring confinement in securitized spaces, but also 
produces material barriers to access for/to the detainees. In response to calls in 2011 by 
the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture to allow visitation 
                                                
12 William Walters (forthcoming, 2016) explores how deportation flights similarly have an ambiguous 
visibility, how they operate in the shadows while simultaneously acting as evidence of the state’s tough 
stance on migration.  
13 Similarly, recent reports emerging from the Greek island of Lesbos’s nascent ‘hotspot’ – a burgeoning 
‘policy solution’ to the Syrian refugee crisis where Frontex officers can screen, register, and either grant 
temporary visas to asylum seekers or send ‘economic migrants’ back to North Africa – detail a highly 
securitized, brightly-visible detention centre abutting a town but secluded both because its doors are locked 
to outsiders and because it is on an island: located in a former military base, the Lesbos hotspot features ‘a 
tall metal fence… guarded by police’ that encircles ‘a huge white tent (which can hold around 400 people)’ 
(The Economist 2016). 
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rights, the Government responded that ‘due to the layout of detention centres, which are 
located within active military barracks or police centres, regular visits cannot be allowed 
for security reasons’ (Council of Europe 2013: 26).  
 
In the UK, the Government commonly repurposes institutes for offenders into detention 
centres, which it calls immigration removal centres (IRCs). IRC Campsfield House was 
initially a Young Offenders Institution and the 19th century Dorset citadel Her Majesty’s 
Prison the Verne was redesignated into a 595-bed IRC in 2014. IRC Dover on the scenic 
but secluded cliffs of Dover is notable for having been a Napoleonic fort, an army 
holding, a prison, and a young offender’s institute, before being repurposed to house 
migrants and asylum seekers in 2002. The link between its carceral history and its current 
incarnation is plainly indicated by the dry moat that continues to encircle it.14  
The Audiences of Detention-as-spectacle 
As argued above, detention-as-spectacle serves to project an image of sovereign power, 
control, and order over non-citizens. There are at least four audiences for detention-as-
spectacle since it: (i) signals the vulnerability of irregular migrants living in the state to 
their potential detainability and deportability; (ii) projects out from state borders to 
would-be migrants, to discourage them from attempting to reach a particular border; (iii) 
works to assure the local population that their government holds the monopoly of power 
over territorial borders and mobility; and (iv) demonstrates to other states and 
international organizations that the sovereign is in control of its borders. 
 
In terms of the two migrant audiences within and outside the state, the UK and Maltese 
Governments encourage the belief that detention deters irregular immigration. The UK 
Government frequently references its use of end-to-end mandatory detention as a means 
to deter fraudulent claims and would-be irregular immigrants (Silverman 2013: 38-39). In 
Malta, policymakers point to the 18-month mandatory detention policy as a means of 
facilitating deportation of refused asylum seekers and other migrants. Due to a lack of 
diplomatic relations with countries of origin, administrative hurdles, lack of 
documentation, and other bureaucratic issues, however, both Governments fail to deport 
many detainees. 
 
With regard to the third citizen audience, the imposing architecture of immigration 
enforcement magnifies the impression of successful state control. Prison-like detention 
centres are detention-as-spectacle’s political stages and props. They are visual cues for 
citizens to ‘learn’ that their state exercises a monopoly of power over non-citizens and its 
territory. When citizens do see detention centres, the spectacle is mediated by frames that 
construct detainees as criminals or villains who belong in these carceral institutions. The 
UK and Maltese case studies cohere with the tautology identified by Mountz and her co-
authors (2013: 527): ‘migrants might be criminals, necessitating detention; migrants must 
be criminals, because they are detained.’ 
                                                
14 Our case studies are not exceptional in their use of securitized spaces for immigration detention. For 
example, two-thirds of Spanish detention centres occupy former penitentiaries or military barracks, with 
conditions similar to those within prisons (Jarrín Morán et al 2012). Most Australian detention centres have 
also repurposed ex-military barracks and demountables (Pugliese 2008, 207).  
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Finally, detention-as-spectacle is directed outward from the host state to other states and 
international organizations. This aspect of the spectacle reinforces multiple logics. First, 
it demonstrates a state’s sovereign power over its borders and the associated authority to 
decide who is allowed to stay and who is deemed inadmissible and deportable. The 
control of state borders and the management of immigration flows can become symbols 
of a state’s development, strength, and political dependability. A relatively recent 
historical phenomenon, this interpretation is seen, for example, in foreign aid agreements 
that oblige the recipient state to increase its border security and, in some cases, to assume 
responsibility for the donor state’s immigration controls.15  
 
The second logic directed at this fourth audience of other states is one of simultaneous 
chaos and control (Mountz & Hiemstra, 2014). This narrative presupposes a large volume 
of irregular immigration. Similar to the criminal-detainee tautological loop, states portray 
irregular immigration as out of control and disproportionate in order to justify detaining 
people and to project an impression that the state is, and ought to be, entitled to do so. 
That detention policy must construct such migrant flows as problematic or be rendered 
less relevant is key to detention-as-spectacle. In this way, detention-as-spectacle is 
always directed towards a domestic as well as international audience. In regional 
arrangements, it can act as a salient message to other states and international 
organisations. This is especially the case in Malta where detention is justified on the basis 
that the state faces disproportionate levels of irregular immigration relative to its size and 
thus the state carries excessive responsibility within the European Union. In Malta’s 
demands for more financial and practical support from the EU, the detention policy 
symbolizes the island’s ‘migration crisis’ and detention, in turn, works to reinforce a 
rhetoric that the crisis is threatening Europe (Mainwaring 2012). 
 
Conclusion 
Detention-as-spectacle elucidates state interests in maintaining detention policies much 
more satisfactorily than the conventional justifications that detention facilitates 
deportation, deters irregular immigration, and protects the national community from 
security risks. Drawing on Malta and the United Kingdom as case studies, our analysis of 
detention-as-spectacle reveals the contradictions involved in the policies, practices, 
discursive frames, and justifications of immigration detention. The analysis points to the 
interplay between visibility and invisibility, and reveals what is concealed in the 
spectacle, from detention’s inherent and everyday violence to its financial costs and its 
failure to meet its own policy goals of deterrence and deportation. Our analysis highlights 
the tension between a liberal, technocratic language of ‘management’ and administrative 
measures uttered in the same breath as a language of deterrence, security, and 
punishment. It unveils how detention acts not only to criminalize migrants and create the 
spectre of the ‘illegal alien’ but also to demonstrate and reinforce sovereign power. We 
illustrate how detention is crucial in constructing the impression of a crisis, thereby 
proffering itself as a ‘solution’ to a manufactured problem. 
                                                
15 Examples of such agreements include the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and a group of African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific states; the Security and Prosperity Partnership between the US, Canada, and 
Mexico; and the Regional Resettlement Arrangement between Australia and Papua New Guinea. 
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Socially and politically, detention-as-spectacle makes visible and renders invisible, it 
perpetuates myths and creates distance between people and reality, and between citizens 
and noncitizens. By exploring how detention acts as spectacle, our intervention 
contributes to the literature on detention by not only demonstrating how the spectacle 
reinforces the criminalization of the detained population but also reifies and exaggerates 
state power and the efficacy of detention policy. Moreover, theorizing detention as 
spectacle demonstrates how the political spectacle works more generally to reinforce 
social hierarchies and inequalities. 
 
Detention centres are normalized and embedded within the immigration landscape across 
Europe and other continents. While the political spectacle silences dissent, detainees and 
their supporters sometimes interrupt the carefully constructed theatre. Around the globe, 
detainees engage in acts of everyday resistance, and sometimes in acts of more radical 
protest, from hunger strikes to lip sewing to escape. In these moments, spectators inside 
and outside the detention centres become compelled to act more forcefully to dismantle 
detention-as-spectacle and its narrative of crisis and control.  
 
In both our case studies, resistance has recently erupted to refocus attention on the 
violence of detention. In March 2015, undercover investigative journalists in the UK 
filmed staff inside IRC Yarls Wood uttering racist, violent, and derogatory comments 
about detainees. The exposés came shortly before the release of the national public 
inquiry’s report criticizing many aspects of daily detention life. Protesters staged 
demonstrations inside and outside IRC Yarls Wood and IRC The Verne, and reports 
emerged of peaceful protests and hunger strikes at six additional UK detention sites 
(Silverman 2015). 
 
Similarly, in Malta, the 2012 death of a 32-year-old Cameroonian asylum seeker at the 
hands of detention staff sparked protests inside and outside detention centres and 
prompted a public inquiry. Documenting the shortcomings precipitating violence and 
abuse, the inquiry’s report, released in late 2014, adds to the chorus of criticism levied 
against the Government by NGOs and international actors, including the European Court 
of Human Rights (Valenzia 2014). Ruling against Malta in two cases brought by former 
detainees, the Court concluded that Maltese detention policy hinders human rights 
protection (ECHR 2013a; 2013b). These developments have led the Government to 
announce that they will end the mandatory detention of asylum seekers in 2016.  
 
Pulling back the curtain on the spectacle, these acts of resistance force acknowledgement 
of the violence inherent in detention systems. They momentarily allow spectators and 
those scripted as ‘others’ to redirect and transform the narrative, to make visible what has 
previously been obscured, and to narrow the distance between noncitizen detainee and 
citizen spectator. However, although such disruptions to the spectacle can produce 
piecemeal reform, as recent developments in Malta indicate, the hypervisible narrative of 
detention-as-spectacle and its ordering role in the false crisis of irregular immigration 
continues to hold sway, both onstage and off.  
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